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Abstract  studies  (Bell et al.;  Ethridge;  Baum et al.;  Russell
Three  Georgia  feeder  cattle  teleauction  markets  and Purcell  1980,  1983;  Henderson  1982;  Holder;
were analyzed from  1977  to  1988  to estimate the  Kazmierczak et al.; Rhodus et al.)  have been  con-
impacts of cattle characteristics  and market condi-  ducted  to determine  the  benefits  which accrue  to
tions on prices.  Cattle  characteristic  price impacts  buyers  and sellers  participating  in electronic  mar-
were similar to those in previous studies. The impact  kets.  Benefits vary  depending  on location, type of
of feeder cattle futures price on teleauction price was  commodity  and  market  structure,  and  electronic
positive but varied across markets.  Optimal lot size  trading  system used, but five benefits of electronic
ranged from 143 to 276 head. In one market,  14 lots  markets have been identified-improved  market in-
were necessary  to generate positive price  impacts.  formation, increased operational market efficiency,
Additional buyers were estimated to have a $.30/cwt  improved pricing accuracy,  increased  competition,
per buyer impact on price.  and  improved  market accessibility  for buyers and
sellers.
Key words:  feeder cattle, price analysis, teleauc-  Three methods of electronic marketing of agricul-
tions, electronic marketing  tural  products,  which  differ  only  in  the  type  of
communication and electronics used to handle infor- in  recent years, increased attention has focused on  mation, are  telephone auctions (teleauctions), video
empirically  analyzing the factors that are important  auctions,  and  computerized marketing systems.  In
in feeder cattle price determination. In general, cattle  Georgia,  three  organizations  have  sponsored
and market characteristics have been analyzed as the  teleauctions  throughout  the 1980s.  They all follow
primary influences  on price  (Buccola  1980,  1982;  similar procedures.  Information is gathered on each
Schroeder  et  al.;  Lambert  et  al.).  Cattle  charac-  lot of calves offered for sale. Lot descriptions, pro-
teristics  have  included  weight,  sex,  breed,  health  vided by  each organizer,  include  number of cattle,
treatments,  frame,  muscle,  and fill.  Market  influ-  sex, estimated weight,  location,  breed or combina-
ences  have  included  lot  order  in  auction,  futures  tion of breeds, shrink, health treatments, frame  and
prices,  lot size,  and market location  (Schroeder  et  muscling. A prospectus  is compiled on all available
al.; Lambert  et al.). Most feeder cattle price differ-  lots and sent  to buyers  who  bid via  a conference
ential studies have utilized data from sale barn auc-  telephone  network  on the  day of the teleauction.
tions. One exception was Mahoney's price analysis  Descriptions  of delivery  conditions  or allowances
of Texas  feeder  cattle  sold  through  a  publicly  areoftenincludedontheprospectus,andtransaction
funded, pilot electronic market program which was  prices and the identity of buyers is recorded by the
discontinued shortly after it began. Data from elec-  teleauction  organizer.
tronic  markets  over an  extended number  of years
have not been utilized in a feeder cattle price differ-  Thus,  a livestock teleauction is conducted  based
ential study.  on information flows. Furthermore, the information
Electronic marketing is defined as "simultaneous  on each lot of cattle is separated  into its composite
trade negotiations among spatially separated buyers  parts. This enables the analysis of price determina-
and  sellers  channelled  into  an  interactive  central  tion to focus on  the value of each composite part.
market through electronic communication.  Product  Since  more information  is required  by  teleauction
movement occurs later. Neither traders nor products  buyers (since they do not see the cattle), teleauction
are  physically  assembled  at  a  common  location;  price determination models may explain more of the
products are sold by description rather than personal  deviation in cattle price than would regular sale barn
inspection by buyers" (Henderson,  1984 p. 1). Many  price determination models.
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75Table 1. Descriptive Data for GeorgiaTeleauction Organizations
Teleauction  Organization
Red Carpet  Mitchell Co.
Characteristic  Georgia Farm  Bureau  Cattlemen's Association  Cattlemen's Association
Beginning  Date  03-22-79  05-06-76  03-23-78
Ending Date  10-12-88  11-15-88  03-02-88
Years in Study  10  13  11
Number of Teleauctions  71  41  17
Average  Number of Teleauctions PerYear  7.10  3.15  1.54
Number of  Lots  631  609  140
Average  Lots PerTeleauction  8.88  14.85  8.23
Total  Head  45,497  30,003  21,108
Average Head PerTeleauction  641  732  1242
Average Head Per Lot  72  49  151
Number of Steers  28,706  20,051  15,118
Number of Heifers  16.791  9,952  5,990
Maximum  Head Per Lot  286  236  550
Minimum  Head Per Lot  8  4  24
Number of Buyers  90  59  30
Number of Sellers  130  116  31
Average Commission  Per Head  $6  $5  $4
The purpose of this study was to identify various  mented in Schroeder et al. and recognizes that price
factors that influence feeder cattle price differentials  reflects  the  demand  for  a  lot  of  cattle  given  the
in teleauction  markets in  Georgia.  Three  different  available supply. The price (P) of a lot of cattle (i) at
teleauction organizations were included in the study,  time (t) is related to cattle and lot characteristics (C)
covering the years 1976 to 1988. Afterward, teleauc-  and market forces (M) through the functional form:
tion results from this study were compared to some
previous sale barn price determination studies.  (1)  Pit =  k  Vi  Cik  +  Rht Mht
k  h
DATA AND  PRICE  where  P, C,  M, i, and t are defined as above, and k
DETERMINATION  MODEL  and  h represent  specific  cattle  and lot  traits,  and
Three organizations conduct teleauctions in Geor-  market influences, respectively.  The coefficients V
gia, each within different sections of the state:  Red  and R represent  the value of the trait and the price
Carpet Cattlemen's  Association (RC)  in northwest  impact of the market force, respectively.  Equation 1
Georgia, Mitchell County  Cattlemen's  Association  can be used to estimate the marginal implicit values
(MCCA)  in southwest Georgia,  and Georgia  Farm  of lot characteristics  (Ladd and Martin)  and market
Bureau (GFB) throughout the state of Georgia (Ta-  forces (Mintert et al.).
ble 1).  Primary  data were collected from the three  Cattle  and  lot  characteristics  and  market  influ-
separate teleauction organizers.  Secondary data in-  ences  previously  investigated  include weight,  sex,
cluded local  auction  data  collected  by the United  breed, head per lot, market location (Schwab; Sch-
States Department  of Agriculture and futures data  wab  and  Rister;  Schwab  et al.;  Schroeder  et  al.;
from the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago  Lambert et al.; Mintert et al.); weight-squared, head-
Mercantile Exchange  as reported in the Wall Street  squared  (Menzie et al.; Faminow  and Gum;  Davis
Journal.  et al.; Schroeder et al.; Lambert et al.; Mintert et al.);
Recent research on feeder  cattle price discovery  muscling,  finish, body size, defects, lot uniformity
has followed  Buccola  (1980)  and modeled feeder  (Sullivan and Linton;  Schroeder  et al.;  Lambert et
cattle prices  as a  function of cattle characteristics  al.; Mintert et al.); animal appearance  (Folwell and
and market forces (Schroeder et al.; Lambert et al.).  Rehberg; Schroeder et al.; Lambert et al.); seasonal
The  rationale  behind  this  approach  is well  docu-  factors (Madsen and Liu; Schroeder  et al.;  Mintert
76et al.); time of sale (Buccola, 1982; Schroeder et al.;  as the number  of lots for  sale  increases.  In other
Lambert  et  al.;  Mintert  et  al.);  and  feeder  cattle  words,  there  may  be  a minimum  number  of lots
futures  (Schroeder  et al.).  Other important factors  necessary to attract enough buyers to have a positive
that  could  influence price  in  a teleauction  include  impact  on price.  The  other  independent  variables
delivery  conditions,  input  prices,  nearby  cattle  and  specifications  were  chosen  because  they  are
prices,  and supply  and competitive pressure in the  consistent with economic theory and have been used
auction. If time series data over a long period were  in previous feeder cattle price determination studies
used to estimate V and R of equation 1, then inclu-  (Lambert  et al.;  Schroeder  et  al.).  Ordinary  least
sion of a trend variable to account for inflation would  squares  was  used to  estimate  the model  for  each
be appropriate.  teleauction organization.
Thus, a general model of teleauction feeder cattle  ThebidpricesinGeorgiafeedercattleteleauctions
prices was developed. This general model was then  were based on written information concerning cat-
used to  derive unique models for each teleauction  tie, lot, and delivery characteristics  along  with ex- used to derive  unique models for each teleauction . . .^  a.  ..  'A u  ^  ternal and internal market conditions. These factors organization  depending  on the available  data.  The  i  ii
general  model  specified was as follow:  were used to  estimate  price determination  models general model specified was as follows: for feeder cattle over an extended time period. When
estimating  price  determination  models,  the differ-
(2)  P = f(Sj, FRj, MSCj, FLj, SEX, HEAD, LOTNO,  ences between teleauction organizers becomes  ap-
TREND, Hj, Bj, SHR, HAUL, CUTBACK,  parent. Information was most complete in the GFB
FCF, CF, BAP, TOTLOT, TOTBUY),  auction.  The RC teleauction  lacked information on
certain cattle characteristics  and the total number of
where  variables  are  as  defined  in  Table  2.  SHR,  buyers in each auction (TOTBUY), while informa-
HAUL, and CUTBACK reflect delivery conditions.  tion on the total lots in an auction  (TOTLOT) and
SHR and CUTBACK are allowances from the seller  health  treatments  was  deleted  from  the  MCCA
to the buyer with respect to shrinkage and culling at  model due to multicollinearity problems.
shipment and were measured as intercept shifters (0,
1 dummy  variables).  Though  percentage  pencil  RESULTS
shrink allowed can vary, more than 99 percent of the
lots in this study where shrink was allowed (which  The results are presented as follows. First, parame-
was  70  percent  of the  total  lots)  allowed  2  or  3  ter estimates  from the price  determination models
percent shrink. Thus, an intercept shifter for shrink  are discussed, then the results are compared to other
was appropriate.  HAUL is a description of whether  price  differential  studies. Teleauction  price models
the cattle are to be hauled off the farm to a pick-up  for sponsoring organizations are addressed individu-
point. CF represents the nearby corn futures contract  ally (Table 3).
price on the day of the teleauction and is a proxy for
an input price. The total number of lots in a particular  The Georgia Farm Bureau Model
teleauction  (TOTLOT)  represents  supply,  while  The Georgia Farm Bureau (GFB) model explained
TOTBUY (the number of different buyers) is a proxy  approximately 88 percent of the variation in teleauc-
for competitive pressure. The relationships between  tion price. The base lot for reference was a medium
P and HEAD and P and TOTLOT were hypothesized  frame, medium flesh, muscle grade 2 lot of heifers,
to  be curvilinear,  thus necessitating  squared terms  containing  less than  50 percent  of any  one breed,
for both  HEAD and TOTLOT  in Equation 2.  The  with  no  health treatments  specified,  with  an esti-
justification for using quadratic terms for HEAD and  mated weight of 500-599 lbs., sold in the summer.
TOTLOT relate  to  investigating  optimal  lot  sizes  All  of the included  seasonal variables  (Sj)  were
(HEAD) and number of lots (TOTLOT) in a teleauc-  significant  at the 0.01  level  with the greatest price
tion. It could  be expected  that buyers  prefer larger  effect (-$3.45/cwt.)  being in the fall. The least price
lots until some maximum is reached.  Furthermore,  effect occurred in the spring (-$2.48/cwt.). Since the
Schroeder  et al., Lambert  et al.,  and Mintert et al.  seasonal variables were negative, they indicated that
found that  a quadratic  approach  to  estimating  the  summer, followed by spring, was the high-price time
impact  of lot  size  was  effective.  Likewise,  some  for a producer  (seller) to market cattle, ceteris  pari-
minimum  number  of lots  in  a  teleauction  might  bus. One of the frame variables,  small (FR3), had a
exist, before which price decreases, and after which  significant  negative  effect  (0.01  level)  on  price
price increases, ceterisparibus.  The logic behind the  (-$6.44/cwt.),  while  the  large  and medium  frame
investigation  for  a  minimum  number  of lots  in a  (FRl)variable  had  no  significant  impact on  price.
teleauction is based on the attraction of more buyers  This result implies  that medium frame  cattle were
77Table 2.  Variable Definitions for Feeder Cattle  Price Determination  Model
Variable  Definition  Measurement
P  Teleauction price for a particular lot  ($/cwt.)
Si  Season  1  ifj
where j = 1 if winter (January-March)  0 otherwise
= 2 if spring (April-June)
= 3 if summer (July-September)
= 4 if fall (October-December)
FRj  Frame  1  if j
where j = 1 if medium and large  0 otherwise
= 2  if medium
=  3 if small
MSC  Muscle  1  if Grade 1
0 otherwise
FLI  Flesh  1  if j
where j = 1 if heavy  0 otherwise
=  2 if medium
=  3 if light
EWj  Weight  1  if j
where j = 1 if 200-299 Ibs.
=  2 if 300-399 Ibs.
=  3 if 400-499 Ibs.
= 4 if 500-599 Ibs.
= 5 if > 600 Ibs.
SEX  Sex  1 if steers
0 if heifers
HEAD  Number of cattle in lot  Actual number
HEAD2  Number of cattle in lot squared  Actual number
LOTNO  Order of the lot in the teleauction  Ascending
TREND  1,...N  Actual number
where N = number of auctions in data set
Hj  Health Treatment  1 if j
where j = 1 if cattle were dewormed  0 if otherwise
= 2 if cattle were treated for external parasites
= 3 if cattle were given a growth  stimulant
= 4 if cattle were treated for a specific disease
= 5 if cattle were dehorned, tattooed,  etc.
= 6 if cattle were weaned
= 7 if cattle were described as preconditioned; common interpretation
includes multiple health treatments and feed  management
practices.
B j Breed  1 if j is greater than 50%
where j = 1 if Hereford or Hereford dominant cross  of lot
= 2 if Angus or Angus dominant cross  0 if otherwise
= 3 if Brahman  or Brahman  dominant cross
= 4 if Exotic or Exotic dominant cross
= 5 if Dairy
= 6 if Mixed
SHR  Shrinkage allowed  1 if shrink allowed
0 otherwise
HAUL  Cattle were to be hauled to pick-up point  1 if cattle hauled off farm
0 otherwise
CUTBACK  Buyer has right to cull specified percentage of cattle at shipping  1 if cutback allowed
0 otherwise
FCF  Closing feeder cattle futures  price for the nearby contract on  the day the  $/cwt.
teleauction occurred
CF  Closing corn futures price for the nearby contract on the day the teleauction  $/bu.
occurred
BAP  Nearby sale barn price for similar cattle, day before the teleauction occurred  $/cwt.
TOTLOT  Total  number of lots in the teleauction  Actual number
TOTLOT2  TOTLOT squared  Actual number
TOTBUY  Total number of different buyers in the teleauction.  Actual number
78Table 3. Parameter  Estimates for Georgia Feeder Cattle Teleauction  Price Determination  Models
Parameter Estimates  Parameter Estimates
(t-values)  (t-values)
Sponsoring Organization  Sponsoring Organization
Georgia  Georgia
Independent  Farm  Mitchell  Independent  Farm  Mitchell
Variables  Bureau  Red Carpet  County  Variables  Bureau  Red Carpet  County
- $/cwt  --  $/cwt  —
Intercept  -13.9519  -4.2721  -20.3930  H 5 (dehorned,  1.1033  -0.8032
(-4.444**)  (-1.952**)  (-2.128*)  etc.)  (1.216)  (-0.344)
Si (Winter)  -3.1847  -0.0438  -0.6669  He  (weaned)  -0.4896  -0.0419
(-5.592***)  (-0.063)  (-0.784)  (-0.718)  (-0.070)
S2 (Spring)  -2.4812  0.3002  H7  (preconditioned)  1.4397  1.9209
(-4.210***)  (0.446)  (1.481)  (2.635***)
S4 (Fall)  -3.4516  1.0747  B 1 (Hereford)  0.1850  0.03614  0.6758
(-5.803***)  (1.737*)  (0.381)  (0.071)  (1.073)
FR1  (Med. &  Large)  -0.4992  -0.0514  B2 (Angus)  0.6514  0.4234  -0.0164
(-1.332)  (-0.067)  (1.772*)  (1.057)  (-0.033)
FR 3 (Small)  -6.4481  B3 (Brahman)  -0.0423  0.9791  -1.1205
(-3.811 ***)  (-0.063)  (1.365)  (-1.644*)
MSC1  (Heavy)  0.3714  2.7701  B 4(Exotic)  -0.2740  0.5661  -3.0080
(0.251)  (2.887***)  (-0.530)  (1.091)  (-3.641***)
FL1  (Heavy)  -1.5517  Bs (Dairy)  -10.6781  0.0393
(-0.428)  (-6.230***)  (0.074)
FL 3 (Light)  0.6102  Be (mixed)  0.8860  0.3154  0.4985
(1.459)  (1.378)  (0.600)  (0.253)
EW1  (200-299)  2.9431  SHR  1.0826  -0.0977  2.3092
(1.118)  (1.048)  (-0.271)  (2.156**)
EW2 (300-399)  5.4859  -0.2290  HAUL  -0.4991
(5.093***)  (-0.225)  (-0.352)
EW 3 (400-499)  1.8461  1.2506  -9.4644  CUTBACK  -0.2584  1.9357  0.8584
(3.341***)  (2.561***)  (-4.779***)  (-0.732)  (1.148)  (1.278)
EWs (600-699)  -2.6241  -2.6161  -0.8974  FCF  1.0119  0.6820  0.8556
(-5.967***)  (-6.548***)  (-1.497)  (35.435***)  (15.629***)  (14.958***)
SEX (Steers)  6.8047  4.4876  4.8299  CF  -0.8713  -1.4313  -1.2058
(20.375)  (9.789***)  (6.500***)  (-2.580**)  (-4.181***)  (-1.078)
HEAD  0.0545  0.0358  0.0132  BAP  0.0544  0.3542  0.1995
(4.370***)  (2.469***)  (2.165**)  (3.371***)  (7.980***)  (2.651***)
HEAD2  -0.00019  -0.00009  -0.000024  TOTLOT  -0.3504  0.0744
(-3.851 ***)  (-1.097)  (-2.043**)  (-3.573***)  (0.802)
LOTNO  -0.1048  -0.0616  0.0824  TOTLOT2  0.01248  -0.0033
(-3.152***)  (-2.546***)  (1.549)  4.454***  (-1.480)
TREND  0.0653  0.0205  0.4352  TOTBUY  0.0366  0.5787
(4.522***)  (0.692)  (2.904***)  (2.387**)  (0.980)
Hi (dewormed)  0.0714  -0.7252
(0.200)  (-1.074)  Summary Statistics
H2 (parasites)  -0.1572  1.0259  R 2 0.8915  0.8999  0.9790
(-0.426)  (1.236)  Adj. R 2 0.8842  0.8946  0.9725
H3 (growth stim.)  -0.3496  -0.3199  F-value  122.214***  169.934***  150.994***
(-0.965)  (-0.555)  Dependent Mean  63.5955  60.9886  67.2107
N  619  597  89
H4  (diseases)  0.4548  1.7816
(0.804)  (3.743***)  * =  significant at the .10 level.
**  = significant at the .05 level.
*** = significant at the .01  level.
79preferred in the GFB teleauction.  The muscle vari-  The Red Carpet Cattlemen's Association Model
able  (MSC) was not significant  at the  0.10 level.
Neither of the flesh variables (FLj) had a significant  The  Red  Carpet  Cattlemen's  Association  (RC)
(0.10 level) effect on price. The base flesh category  price model explained approximately 90 percent of
was  medium.  Of  the  estimated  weight  variables  the variation  in teleauction  price.  The base lot for
(EWj)  tested,  three  were  significant  (0.01  level)  reference was a lot of 500-599 lb. heifers sold in the
relative  to the base  category  of 500-599  lbs.  The  summer.  Only one seasonal variable,  fall (S4), was
light weights had a positive influence on price while  significant at the 0.10 level. It has a positive effect
the heaviest weight had a -$2.62/cwt. effect on price  on  teleauction  price  of  $1.07/cwt.  Red  Carpet
The steer (SEX) variable was significant at the 0.01  teleauctions  reported  no  frame,  muscle,  or  flesh
level.  Steers brought a premium of $6.80/cwt. over  information on the teleauction  prospectus, so these
heifers.  HEAD and HEAD2 were significant at the  factors were not included in the analysis. Two of the
0.01 level. Indications are that GFB teleauction price  three  weight  categories  (EW)  tested  were signifi-
reaches a maximum at a lot size of about 143 head,  cant  at  the  0.05  level  with  the  largest  discount
ceteris paribus. However,  the  effect  of  LOTNO  (-$2.61/cwt.) occurringintheover600  bs. category.
indicated a discount of -$0.10/cwt.  and was signifi-  The 500-599  bs. category was used as the base. The
cant  at  the  0.01  level.  LOTNO  is  an  important  greatest premium ($1.25/cwt.)  was for 400-499 Ibs.
variable  in  this model  because  of the general  hy-  cattle
pothesis  of downward  trending  prices in  auctions  The SEX variable was significant at the 0.01 level
(Buccola).  This hypothesis was confirmed because  and steer lots increased price by $4.48/cwt.  HEAD
as lot  number increased  by  one,  teleauction  price  was also significant  at the 0.01 level and indicated
decreased by  10 cents per hundredweight. The trend  that as lot size increased by one head, price increased
variable was significant  at the 0.01 level and indi-  by $.03/cwt. HEAD2 was not significant at the 0.10
cated  a positive trend over  time of $0.06/cwt.  per  level which implies that a positive linear relationship
auction.  This  reflects  the  price  inflation  over  the  existed  between  lot size and  price.  LOTNO  indi-
sample time period.  cated a discount of -$0.06/cwt., again supporting the
None of the health treatment variables  (Hj) were  hypothesis of price  decreasing during the auctions.
significant  at the  0.10  level.  Lots  with  no  health  The TREND variable was not significant at the 0.10
treatments  served  as  the  base  lot.  Of  the  breed  level.
variables (Bj),  only two were significant at the 0.10
level. Angus and Angus crosses (B2) had a premium  Two of the health  treatment variables  (Hj) were
of  $0.65/cwt.  while  lots  with  a  majority  of dairy  significant at the 0.01 level.  Specific  disease treat-
cattle (B4) had discounts of-$10.67/cwt. None of the  ment (H 4)  and pre-conditioning  (H7) had positive
delivery variables  (SHR, HAUL, and CUTBACK)  effects  on  price  with  the  largest  influence
were significant at the 0.10 level.  ($1.92/cwt.) associated with pre-conditioning.  This
implies that buyers are willing to pay premiums for The three external market variables  were signifi-  pa  premiums for
cattle that have been treated for specific disease such cant at the 0.05 level and all had appropriate  signs.  cattlethathavebeentreated  specificdiseasesuch
Two of the variables, feeder cattle futures (FCF) and  as blackleg  and TB or have been pre-conditioned.
before-auction  price,  had  a  positive  effect  on  None of the breed variables (Bj) tested were signifi- before-auction  price,  had  a  positive  effect  on
cant at the 0.10 level. Again, neither of the delivery teleauction  price  with  the largest  influence  being  cantatheAgainneitdeli
associated with nearby feeder cattle futures contract  C  as siniiant at
the 0.10 level.  It should be mentioned  that most of price  ($1.01/cwt.).  Nearby  corn  futures price  (CF)  t  l  entid  at  o 
had  a.  negative  efetnthe  RC  lots were brought  to a  central location  for had  a negative  effect on price  of -$0.87/cwt.  The
parameter estimate for FCF indicates an almost one  l
to one change with GFB price.  All  three  of the external  market  variables  were
All of the internal market variables included in the  significant  at the 0.01  level.  Feeder cattle  futures
GFB model  were  significant  at the  0.05  level  or  (FCF) and before-auction price (BAP) had positive
lower. The TOTLOT and TOTLOT2 variables indi-  effects  on  price  with  the  largest  influence
cate that up to 14 lots, price decreases as number of  ($0.68/cwt.)  associated  with  feeder  cattle  futures.
lots increased  while  after  14  lots,  price  increases  Corn futures (CF) had a negative effect on price with
with additional lots, ceterisparibus.  Thus, it appears  a discount of -$1.43/cwt. All of the parameter esti-
that 14 lots attract enough buyers to begin to have a  mates  for  the  external  market  variables  had  the
positive  impact  on  price.  Each  additional  buyer  expected  signs. Neither of the internal market vari-
(TOTBUY)  had  the  impact  of increasing  the bid  ables (TOTLOT and TOTLOT2) tested were signifi-
price by $0.30/cwt.  cant at the 0.10 level.  The total number of lots in an
80auction did not appear to have a significant linear or  auction price also had a positive effect of $0.19/cwt.
curvilinear relationship with price.  on price. The total number of buyers (TOTBUY) in
an auction was not a significant explanatory variable
The Mitchell County Cattlemen's  in the MCCA model.
Association  Model
Parameter  estimates  for Mitchell  County  Cattle-  Summary and Comparisons
men's  Association  (MCCA)  teleauction  price  are  Similar  results across  all three models  related to
also shown  in  Table  3.  This model  explained  ap-  external  market conditions.  The  impact  of nearby
proximately  97 percent of the variation  in teleauc-  feeder  cattle  futures  contract  price  to  teleauction
tion price. The base lot was a lot of medium frame,  price ranged from $1.01/cwt.  in GFB, to $0.68/cwt.
muscle  grade  2,  500-599  lb.  heifers  sold  in  the  in RC.  The implication  is that the GFB teleauction
spring.  prices respond in an almost proportional manner to
Since  MCCA conducted  teleauctions  during two  futures  prices,  while  the other  two  organizations
seasons, only one season, winter (Si), was included  have less direct responses. One possible explanation
in the model. The other season, spring, served as the  for these observed differences is that national buyers
base. Season had no significant effect on teleauction  may  respond  to futures  prices  quicker  than local
price. Frame size (FRj) likewise  had no significant  buyers,  and most of the cattle sold over GFB and
effect. Muscle grade  1 (MSC) was significant at the  MCCA leave  Georgia for feedlots  while many lots
0.01  level and  had  a positive  impact  on  price  of  of RC cattle are sold to local buyers.
$2.77/cwt.  relative to  muscle grade  2.  One of the  Corn futures  price  effects  on  feeder  cattle price
weight categories, 400-499 lbs. (EW3), had a signifi-  ranged from -$0.87/cwt. (GFB) to -$1.43/cwt. (RC)
cant discount (-$9.46/cwt.). This result is most likely  across  the three  organizations,  which is consistent
due  to  the  small  number  of observations  in  this  with  the  notion  of  one  rising  input  price  (corn)
category relative to the other categories and the time  affecting adversely the price of another input (feeder
period when these cattle were sold. Over 80 percent  cattle). Again, the variation in the magnitude of the
of the  cattle marketed  in  the MCCA  teleauctions  estimates for corn futures price could  be attributed
were over 600 lbs.  to national versus local buyers. The effect of before-
The SEX variable  indicated that steers sold for a  auction price was slight ($0.05/cwt., GFB) to strong
premium of $4.82/cwt.  The signs and magnitude of  ($0.35/cwt.,  RC). These results further substantiate
HEAD  and HEAD2 indicated that price reached  a  the strong local buying pressure in the RC teleauc-
maximum at a lot size  of about 276 head,  ceteris  tions.
paribus. This is  almost twice the size of the GFB  The  internal  market  variables  tested have  some
optimal lot size. The parameter estimate for LOTNO  similarity  across teleauctions. The optimal lot size
was not significant at the 0.10 level, indicating that  ranged from 143 head in GFB to 276 head in MCCA
price was not affected by when the lot was sold in  while RC exhibited a linear relationship between lot
the MCCA auction.  This result is contrary  to most  size and price. The difference in optimal lot size is,
published results (Buccola; Lambert et al.) and may  in part, a function of the GFB and MCCA teleauc-
be peculiar to the large and few lots characteristic of  tions.  MCCA  is  operated  by  a  local  cattlemen's
MCCA teleauctions.  association  and  the number  of head  per lot  there
The TREND  parameter estimate indicated  a sig-  averaged 151  as compared to an average lot size of
nificant  positive  trend  of $0.43/cwt.  per  auction.  72 for GFB and 49 for RC. The order of the lot in
Only two of the breed variables (Bj) were significant  the teleauction  had  a negative  impact in  GFB and
at the 0.10 level. Brahman and Brahman crosses (B 3)  RC, but no impact in MCCA.  The total number of
and  Exotic  and  Exotic  crosses  (B4)  had  negative  lots had a curvilinear effect in the GFB teleauction
effects on price with the largest discount accruing to  and implied that a minimum of 14 lots was necessary
the  Exotic  breeds  of  -$3.00/cwt.  Of  the  delivery  before a positive impact on price resulted.  Delivery
variables  tested,  SHR was  significant  at  the  0.05  conditions  had  a  significant  impact  only  in  the
level  and had  a positive  impact  of $2.30/cwt.  on  MCCA model, where allowing shrinkage increased
price, ceteris paribus.  price by $2.30/cwt.
Two of the three external market variables, feeder  A comparison  of the price  differential  model  re-
cattle futures (FCF) and before-auction price (BAP),  suits here to two other feeder cattle studies is pre-
were significant at the 0.01 level. Corn futures (CF)  sented  in  Table  4.  Because  of  differences  in
had  no  significant  effect  on  price.  A $1.00/cwt.  objectives, methods,  measurements,  and time peri-
increase  in  feeder  cattle  futures  had the  effect of  ods,  comparisons  of the parameter  estimates from
increasing  the MCCA  price by  $0.85/cwt.  Before-  the different studies must be done with caution.
81Table 4. Comparison of Significant (0.10 level) Results of Feeder Cattle Price Differential Studies
Different Studies
Item  GeorgiaTeleauctions  Schroeder et al.  Lambert et al.
Cattle Characteristics
Frame  -6.44  -9.80 to -4.10  -8.38
Small
SEX  4.48 to 6.80  -13.274
(Steers = 1)  (Steers = 0)
(Heifers = 0)  (Heifers = 1)
Breeds
Angus (+  crosses)  0.65  -1.74  to -0.946  -6.232
Exotic (+  crosses)  -3.00  0.886 to 1.045
Dairy  -10.67  -10.10 to -7.31  -8.53
Lot
Characteristics
HEAD  0.054 to 0.013  0.131  to 2.82  0.086
HEAD2  -0.00019 to -0.000024  -0.00305 to -0.00101  0.000795
Internal Market
Conditions
Lot order  -0.11  to -0.05  0.838 to 2.470  -0.22 to -0.67
External  Market
Conditions
Futures  0.68 to 1.01  0.314 to 0.983
Summary Statistics
R 2 (adjusted)  0.89 to 0.97  0.71  to 0.74  0.69
RMSE  1.72 to 3.57  3.31  to 5.14  7.40
Observations  89 to  619  2,172 to 5,574  11,953
Small frame  cattle are discounted  heavily  in  all  tions are that teleauctions  have larger  optimal  lot
three studies.  The studies also indicate that lighter  sizes.
weight feeder  cattle bring premiums.  Heifers were  Raising  the number  of the order  of a  lot  in  an
discounted more in Lambert et al. than in this study.  auction usually had a discounting impact  on price.
With respect  to breeds,  differences  existed  across  This  result  occurred  here,  in  Lambert  et al.,  and
studies  except  with  respect to dairy  cattle,  which  Buccola.  The  exception  was  in Schroeder  et  al.,
were discounted  heavily across  all  studies.  Angus  where the opposite occurred.
and Angus  crosses brought premiums in this study  Schroeder et al. and this study included futures as
while this breed was discounted in the other studies.  an influential factor with similar results. One inter-
The opposite  occurred with Exotic  crosses, which  pretation of this parameter estimate is to view it as
brought a premium in Lambert et al. and a discount  a proxy for the responsiveness of a local market to
in this study.  Possible explanations  for this incon-  a national market. The closer the parameter estimate
gruent result could relate to length (10 weeks vs.  10  is to 1, the more efficiently  the local market incor-
years)  of the respective  time  series  and the  time  porates information from the national market. Sum-
periods  (1981  vs.  1976-1988)  examined,  and  the  mary  statistics  for  the  studies  indicate  that  the
location of cattle (Kansas vs, Georgia).  models  presented  here  explain more  of  the price
Lot size and lot size squared were included in the  variation with more efficiency.
other studies, along with this study. Parameter esti-
mates were of similar size and sign. If one computesMP  ATONS
optimal lot sizes for these three  studies, the differ-
ences  are noticeable.  The optimal  lot size for this  Electronic  marketing  of feeder  cattle in Georgia
study was  143 to 276, depending on the organizer.  has been a relatively minor marketing alternative in
For the Schroeder  et al. study, the optimal lot size  terms of cattle volume. Yet, three organizations have
ranged from 46 to 64, while for Lambert  et al.  the  offered  this  alternative  to  Georgia  producers
optimal size was 54. Though caution should be used  throughout the 1980s. Electronic marketing appears
in interpreting  the above  optimal lot sizes, indica-  to be a viable alternative for feeder cattle producers.
82The internal market factors hypothesized to affect  consistent for all markets tested. It can be argued that
teleauction price were, in most cases, significant. In  the  relationship  between  teleauction  price  and
both the organizations (GFB and MCCA) where the  nearby feeder cattle futures price is a measure of the
total number of buyers in an auction could be tested,  teleauction's  ability  to transmit  price  information.
an additional buyer increased price. This result sup-  This  study  illustrated  that  this  ability  varies  by
ports one motivation  behind the electronic  market-  teleauction operator and might be directly related to
ing concept,  attracting more potential buyers.  buyer composition. That is, national buyers are more
With respect to optimal lot size, results indicated  likely to transmit futures information than are local
that this was  teleauction-specific  and varied  from  buyers.
143 to 276 head. Information on optimal lot size can  The effect of local auction prices  on teleauction
be valuable to teleauction operators  when they ad-  prices also was investigated  and found to vary de-
vise producers  on market strategies.  pending on operator.  The prices for the two teleauc-
It appears that the order of a lot in teleauctions has  tions organized  by local producer groups  (RC and
a less  depressing  effect  than in sale barn livestock  MCCA)  were  influenced  more  by  local  auction
auctions.  Of course,  the larger  lot sizes and  large  prices  than were those in the statewide teleauction
number of buyers could contribute to the neutraliza-  (GFB). The rationale behind this result is similar to
tion of lot order.  that  associated  with feeder  cattle  futures.  Buyers
Tests on the curvilinear relationship  between the  transfer the pressure that is exerted  on them. If the
number of lots in a GFB teleauction and price  re-  pressure  is  local,  then local influences  (i.e.,  local
vealed a minimum at 14 lots. That is, price decreased  prices) will be passed on.
until, and increased beyond, 14 lots, ceterisparibus.  ted to lea Overall, this research has contributed to learning One explanation of this result relates  to the notion  m  a  more  about  the important  factors  that  determine that more lots for a sale attract more buyer interest.  feeder  cattle price.  The  microdata  available  f feeder cattle  price.  The microdata  available  from It appears that for the GFB teleauction, a minimum  teleauctions  should open several  research avenues.
of 14 lots attracts enough buyer pressure to generate  These include feeder cattle differentiation by buyer
a positive impact on price. Furthermore,  this result  type and  theeffect of reputation  trading  on price.
would tend to support the notion of greater producer wouldtendtosupportthenotionofgreaterproducer  Both of these research activities could help teleauc- advantage associated with multiple lot (greater than
tion operators develop strategies to increase market 14 in the GFB case) teleauctions. share and help producers with their marketing deci- The external market factors hypothesized to influ-  sions
ence price were  significant in almost all cases  and
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